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Abstract
As of the early 2000s, the gap in college enrollment between children growing up
in the highest income quartile and the lowest income quartile was over 50 percentage
points (Bailey and Dynarski 2011). While previous work has analyzed the impact of
various federal and state nancial aid programs on college enrollment rates among low
and moderate-income households, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has largely
been overlooked as a potential source of nancial aid. As of the 2011 tax year, the
maximum federal EITC benet was nearly $6,000, worth up to 45% of household
earned income for low-income families. In addition to the federal credit, 24 states
and the District of Columbia have implemented and expanded state EITCs, worth
between 3-45% of the federal EITC. Utilizing variation in the timing of state EITC
implementation, as well as changes in the generosity of state EITC benets over time,
I use a dierence-in-dierence framework to analyze how an increase in household
income aects the educational attainment of children from low-educated households.
Conservative estimates suggest that following an increase in the maximum EITC by
$1,000, 18-23 year old children growing up in likely EITC-eligible households are 1
percentage point more likely to have ever enrolled in college and 0.3 percentage points
more likely to complete a bachelor's degree.
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The gap in college enrollment rates between children growing up in low-income and high-
income households has been well documented in the literature (Bailey and Dynarski 2011;
Long 2008). As of the early 2000s, children growing up in the bottom income quartile
were 50 percentage points less likely to enroll in college compared to children growing up
in the highest income quartile (Bailey and Dynarski 2011). While some suggest that this
gap results from a lack of academic preparedness for higher education among the poor
(Carneiro and Heckman 2002), there has been evidence that nancial constraints play an
increasingly important role in college enrollment decisions in recent decades (Belley and
Lochner 2007). The extent to which the cost of college aects college-going among children
is much-debated in the literature. There is a long literature examining the eects of household
income and nancial aid programs on educational attainment with some studies nding little
or no impact of household income on college enrollment (Cameron and Taber 2004; Carneiro
and Heckman 2002; Hilger 2013b), while others have found signicant increases in college
enrollment associated with increases in household income (Abraham and Clark 2006; Belley
and Lochner 2007; Dynarski 2003; Kane 2007; Lovenheim 2011).1
One potential source of exogenous variation in household income not fully evaluated is
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC is the largest cash transfer program in the
U.S., redistributing over $60 billion dollars to low-income households in 2010 (Tax Policy
Center 2013). The EITC is designed to subsidize low-wage work, with recent estimates
suggesting that the EITC helped lift 3.1 million children out of poverty in 2011 (Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities 2013). In addition to providing income to low-income families
with young children, the EITC also incentivizes college-going by providing conditional cash
1Kane (1994) nds that while children from low-income households are responsive to the costs of college,
increasing nancial aid policies may not increase college enrollment rates if individuals do not have full
information about the amount of nancial aid available to them.
1transfers to children who are full-time students between the ages of 19 and 23. While there
have been numerous studies exploring how the EITC aects low-income households (see Hotz
and Scholz (2003) or Meyer (2010) for a review), there has only recently been a focus on
the eects of the EITC on the children of EITC recipients (e.g. Dahl and Lochner (2012);
Hoynes, Miller, and Simon (2012)).
This paper examines the eect of the EITC on the educational attainment of children of
EITC recipients, making the following three contributions to the literature: rst, this paper
adds to the literature on the impacts of the EITC on children of EITC recipients. This is
the rst analysis of the eects of the EITC on educational attainment to address both the
short-run impact of the EITC as a conditional cash transfer to college-aged children and
the long-run impact of increasing household income when children are young. Second, this
work contributes to the literature on the eects of nancial aid on college enrollment by
exploiting a new source of exogenous variation: expansions of state EITC benets. Third,
using variation in the timing of state EITC benet changes, this analysis contributes to
the debate about when income transfers are most important to education outcomes: when
children are young or when they are college-aged.
There are several characteristics of the EITC that make it a good source of nancial aid
for low-income families. First, the EITC is a substantial credit, worth nearly $6,000 in 2012
for households that earned between $13,000 and $22,300.2 Second, the EITC requires that
in order to claim a child as a dependent, she must be under the age of 18 at the end of the
year, or under the age of 24 and a full-time student. Since there is a very small EITC benet
available to households with no children, this conditional cash transfer provides a strong
incentive for EITC-eligible households to encourage their children to go to college. However,
2The maximum EITC benet is comparable to the maximum Pell Grant in 2012, and applies to households
with roughly the same income. For a single-headed household with one child, the maximum Pell Grant is
given to households that earn less than approximately $24,500 in 2011. EITC benets are not reported on
the FAFSA and are not considered in determining nancial aid (?).
2unlike traditional forms of nancial aid, families are not required to spend the EITC benet
on education-related expenses.
Finally, the EITC has an advantage over traditional forms of nancial aid in that it does
not require the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) to determine eligibility.
Recent research on the FAFSA suggests that its complexity serves as a signicant barrier
to college enrollment, and that simplifying the application would increase the probability
that a low-income child attends college (Bettinger et al. 2012; Dynarski and Scott-Clayton
2006, 2008). The EITC, on the other hand, requires only an additional sheet to attach to
the federal 1040 tax form.3 Perhaps because the EITC is easy to claim, and many low-
income taxpayers utilize free services or professional tax preparers to complete their taxes,
the EITC has a fairly high participation rate compared to other welfare programs, at over
80% of eligible taxpayers (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2012).
While the EITC could be thought of as a typical form of nancial aid, where bene-
ts can be used to directly pay for higher education, it also may work through indirect
channels. EITC recipients are typically eligible for the credit for consecutive years (Acker-
man, Holtzblatt, and Masken 2009), and many expect to receive it every year (Tach and
Halpern-Meekin 2013). Children of EITC recipients may benet from several years of in-
creased income throughout their childhoods, and these benets may improve their quality of
schooling while young, increasing the likelihood that they complete high school and enroll in
college. Several studies have analyzed the types of purchases made with EITC benets, sug-
gesting that many recipients use the money to pay down debt (Smeeding, Ross-Phillips, and
O'Connor 2002; Tach and Halpern-Meekin 2013), save money for their children (Tach and
Halpern-Meekin 2013), and make other purchases to generally improve their social standing
3The federal tax code already provides nancial aid to college students through the Hope Tax Credit and
the Lifetime Learning Credit, which are worth around $2,000 in non-refundable credits. Long (2004) shows
that because these credits are non-refundable, they are more likely to help middle-income households and
households where individuals would have attended college regardless of the credit.
3(Smeeding, Ross-Phillips, and O'Connor 2002).
There has been some evidence suggesting that the EITC increases short-term test scores
of children aged 5 to 15 (Dahl and Lochner 2012), but test score gains may be a poor
proxy for outcomes in later life such as high school completion, college enrollment, or higher
wages. Previous research has shown that test score gains tend to fade out over time after
policy interventions end (Currie and Thomas 2000; Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims 2010; Kane
and Staiger 2008), increasing the need for further research to assess whether test score gains
from the EITC translate into improvements in longer-term outcomes. Following Dahl and
Lochner (2012), there have been a couple of studies attempting to analyze how the EITC
aects college enrollment, yet neither study has been able to capture both the short-run and
long-run impacts of the EITC on college enrollment. Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko (2011)
focus on the long-run impact of the EITC by examining the impact of an increase in child test
scores on college enrollment. The authors nd that a 1 standard deviation increase in test
scores leads to a 5.5 percentage point increase in college enrollment rates. To put this nding
in the context of Dahl and Lochner (2012), the authors suggest that a $1,000 increase in the
EITC is associated with a 0.3 percentage point increase in college enrollment. If the EITC
also increases college enrollment through conditional cash transfers to college-aged children,
the estimate found by Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko (2011) would understate the true eect
of the EITC. Using the same tax data, Hilger (2013a) analyzes how increases in the EITC
for children near college age aects college enrollment but nds no signicant increase in
college enrollment associated with the EITC. This is likely due to two primary factors: rst,
Hilger (2013a) restricts his sample to children who can be matched to their fathers, which
likely eliminates a signicant share of the EITC-eligible population.4 Second, Hilger (2013a)
470% of EITC dollars go to families ling as head of household (Tax Policy Center 2006). Approximately
76% of EITC claims from head-of-household lers are female-headed households (Ackerman, Holtzblatt, and
Masken 2009). Together, this suggests that approximately half of all EITC dollars go to households where
no father is present.
4generates these results based solely on the non-linearities in the EITC benet structure,
where all recipients face the same incentives to send their children to college through the
conditional cash transfer aspect of the EITC.
In this paper, I use a dierence-in-dierences analysis with variation in the treatment
dosage to evaluate the impact of changes in state EITC benets on the educational attain-
ment of children. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, several states implemented their own
EITCs that piggy-back o of the federal EITC. As of the 2012 tax year, 23 states and the
District of Columbia oered some form of a state EITC. For the vast majority of these state
credits, federal eligibility determines state eligibility and credits are typically a xed percent
of the federal benet (ranging from 3-45%). Many states also changed the generosity of their
benets over time, providing variation in both the timing of implementation and the timing
of state EITC benet level changes. I estimate the impact of increases in household income
on college enrollment by comparing outcomes of individuals before and after changes in state
EITC benets to those of children living in states that never implement EITCs. States that
never implement EITCs may not be adequate counterfactuals if EITC-implementing states
experience secular increases in educational attainment for all children. To address this con-
cern, I also use a triple-dierence strategy comparing changes in outcomes of children of likely
EITC-recipients to trends of children from more auent households within the same state,
relative to changes in outcomes of children living in states that never implement EITCs.
Outcomes of interest include high school completion rates, years of completed schooling, col-
lege enrollment, and college completion. Variation in the timing of state EITC expansions
will also allow for evaluation of heterogenous treatment eects based on how many years an
individual was exposed to a state EITC.
To conduct this analysis, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), pooling panels from 1990 through 2008. I focus on 18{23 year olds for this analysis,
using parental educational attainment as a proxy for EITC-eligibility. Individuals living with
5parents that have no schooling beyond a high school degree will be considered EITC-eligible,
while all others will be considered non-eligible.5
Results suggest that following a $1,000 increase in EITC benets, 18{23 year old children
from low-educated households are more likely to complete high school (2 percentage points
on a base of 70%), have more years of schooling (0.11 of a year on a base of 11.97 years),
and are more likely to have ever enrolled in college (2.5 percentage points on a base of
41%). Controlling for state-specic trends in educational outcomes using children from
highly-educated households yields smaller, but more precisely-estimated positive results.
Compared to children growing up in highly-educated households, a $1,000 increase in the
maximum federal and state EITC benet increases college enrollment among children from
low-educated households by 0.7 percentage points (on a base of 26%), and increases the
likelihood of having a bachelor's degree by 0.3 percentage points (on a base of 3%). I nd
that these eects are much larger for children who were younger than 12 years old at the time
their state implemented an EITC. This suggests that the EITC increases college enrollment
primarily by providing income transfers to households with young children, allowing for
better-quality schooling throughout their childrens' lives.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the structure of the EITC and
how it might aect education outcomes. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 discusses
the empirical strategy, and Section 5 contains results. Section 6 concludes.
2 EITC Background
Since its inception in the 1970s, the EITC has undergone several expansions at both the
federal and state level. As of the 2012 tax year, the EITC provided a benet worth up
to 45% of earnings for households with three or more children. It is also fully refundable,
5Education is often used in the EITC literature to proxy for eligibility, due to concerns of potential
endogeneity of own income (Baker 2008; Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 2009; Celik 2011; Meyer 2010).
6so households with no tax liability receive the EITC benet as a refund. In addition to
the federal benet, 23 states and the District of Columbia have their own EITCs, which
increase the total benet by 3-45% of the federal benet. States implemented their own
EITCs beginning in the late 1980s, but the majority of state EITCs were implemented in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Table 1 shows a list of states that have ever implemented
EITCs, the year of implementation, the benet level at the time of implementation, and the
benet level as of the 2011 tax year. A visual representation of the number of states with
EITCs can be found in Figure 1.
While there is quite a bit of variation in the timing of implementation of state EITCs,
several states also change their benet level over time. For instance, New York implemented
an EITC in 1994 worth just 7.5% of the federal EITC. As of the 2011 tax year, New York
had increased the value of their EITC to 30% of the federal EITC. Other states have had to
reduce or eliminate their EITCs due to budget constraints. Colorado, for instance, had an
8.5% EITC in 1999 but suspended it in 2003 due to lack of funding.
Pooling all states that implemented EITCs, Figure 2 shows the average maximum com-
bined federal and state EITC benet in thousands of (2011) dollars over time since state
EITC implementation. Before states implemented EITCs, the maximum federal EITC and
the combined federal and state EITC were one and the same, and grew only due to real
changes in the federal maximum benet. When the average state in the sample implemented
its EITC, the maximum federal EITC benet was approximately $4,000. Fifteen years after
implementation, the average maximum federal and state EITC had grown to nearly $7,000
in real terms, while the maximum federal EITC alone was worth approximately $5,000 in
year 2011 dollars. Figure 3 shows how the maximum federal and state EITC increased by
calendar year. In 1990, only a few states had their own EITCs, and the average dierence be-
tween the maximum federal EITC and the maximum combined federal and state EITC was
negligible. In 2011, the average maximum federal and state EITC was worth approximately
7$1,000 more than the maximum federal EITC alone.
The EITC is calculated based on the earnings of the head of household and spouse (if
married) and the number of children living in the household. The EITC benet structure
has three segments: a phase-in region, where benets increase as earnings increase; a plateau
region, where benets do not change with increases in earnings; and a phase-out region, where
benets decrease for every extra dollar earned. The steepness of the phase-in and phase-out
segments depends on the number of children living in the household. For a household with
two children, the slope of the phase-in region is 0.40, so every dollar of earnings increases
the EITC benet by 40 cents. Once earnings reach a certain threshold, the EITC benet
is constant until earnings reach a second threshold, at which point benets are phased out
at a rate of 21 cents per dollar for a household with two children. Figure 4 illustrates the
structure of the federal EITC for the 2011 tax year.
While there is a small benet for households with no children, households with children
represent 77% of EITC claims and over 97% of dollars spent on the EITC (Tax Policy Center
2012). A family can claim up to two (three for tax years 2009 and beyond) qualifying children
on their tax forms. Qualifying children are dened as related children under the age of 19
that live in the household for at least 6 months of the year. Children over the age of 18 are
also eligible up until age 24 if they are full-time students.6 Because the benet is contingent
upon full-time enrollment, the EITC can be thought of as a form of nancial aid, yet the
benet itself can be spent however the household chooses. While maximum EITC benets
are over $5,000 for households with two or more children, childless individuals are eligible for
less than $500 as of the 2011 tax year. A couple earning $20,000 in 2011 would be eligible
for the maximum benet of $3,094 claiming one child, but would be ineligible for any EITC
6Children living away at school are considered living in the household during those months and may be
claimed as dependents so long as they do not provide more than half of their own support. `Full-time' status
as dened by the institution. Type of institution does not matter: could be middle school, high school, or
institution of higher education (Internal Revenue Service 2012).
8benet without a dependent. If that family lived in a state that supplemented the federal
EITC they could earn up to an additional $1,392, bringing the total gain in EITC benets to
$4,486 (2011$) for each year their child remained in school after age 18. With the addition
of other types of nancial aid that this family would likely qualify for, these benets could
help nance their child's higher education.7.
2.1 The EITC and educational attainment
There is some literature that suggests that low-income children do not attend college at
the same rate as high-income children not because of short-term nancial constraints, but
because they lack sucient academic preparation to attend college (Cameron and Taber
2004; Carneiro and Heckman 2002). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue that obtaining
loans to pay for college in the short-run is relatively easy, but rather the so-called `long-
term' credit constraints{the inability of parents to borrow against their children's future
earnings to pay for better schooling throughout their children's lives{are what limits college
enrollment among low-income households. They argue that gaps in academic preparedness,
not nancial aid, are what accounts for the majority of the gap in college enrollment rates
between individuals from high-income backgrounds and those from low-income backgrounds.
More recent evidence, however, has shown that gaps in college enrollment rates remain
even after controlling for ability dierences between low-income and high-income households
(Belley and Lochner 2007), suggesting that nancial constraints are playing an increasingly
important role in college enrollment decisions. The EITC could help alleviate both of these
types of constraints by providing short-run nancial aid for children during the college-
going years and by providing more income to low-income households with young children,
7Net costs of a public four-year institution for the 2007-08 school year was $10,000 for individuals in
households that earned less than $32,500 in 2006. Net costs of a public two-year institution for the 2007-08
school year was $6,000 for individuals in households that earned less than $32,500. Net costs reects tuition,
room and board, and other costs; subtracting grant and loan aid. Net costs do not take into account tax
credits or deductions (College Board 2012)
9improving the quality of schooling children receive throughout their lives.
The conditional cash transfer aspect of the EITC is quite similar to the Social Security
Student Benets Program (from here on referred to as SSBP) that provided nancial aid to
college students of retired or deceased parents. Previous research suggests that the SSBP
increased college enrollment among children with deceased fathers by 3.5 percentage points
for every $1,000 of aid (Dynarski 2003). While the program provided generous benets to
qualifying individuals, Dynarski (2003) suggests that at its peak, only 12 percent of full-
time college students received the benet, and only 5 percent of all children experienced the
death of their father before age 18. The EITC presents a similar type of cash transfer as
the SSBP, providing conditional cash transfers through the tax code for students up until
age 24. Compared to the SSBP, the EITC is likely to reach a much larger group of children,
with some recent evidence suggesting that half of households with children will claim the
EITC at some point over an 18-year period (Horowitz and Dowd 2011). This analysis also
provides a more recent picture of how college enrollment of low-income children is aected
by changes in household income.8
Several other studies have found positive eects of income on college enrollment, using
a variety of denitions of income to assess the impact on college enrollment. Recent stud-
ies have used state-specic scholarship programs (Abraham and Clark 2006; Dynarski 2000;
Kane 2007), housing wealth (Lovenheim 2011), and federal regulations concerning drug of-
fenders and eligibility for federal nancial aid (Lovenheim and Owens 2013) to examine the
impact of income on college enrollment, all nding signicant, positive eects of income on
college enrollment.
Beyond serving as a form of nancial aid through conditional cash transfers, the EITC
may also improve the educational attainment of children by providing additional household
8The SSBP has not been in existence for more than 30 years, and more recent evidence suggests that
nancial constraints are playing an increasingly important role in college-going decisions for low-income
households (Belley and Lochner 2007).
10income to low-income families with young children. Recent work by Dahl and Lochner
(2012) has shown that the EITC improves test scores of children from low-income households.
Using a federal expansion of the EITC for two-child households, the authors found that a
$1,000 increase in benets increased math and reading test scores by 6 percent of a standard
deviation. While these eects suggest that the EITC does have a positive impact on the
outcomes of children of EITC recipients, it is not clear whether these eects persist, and
whether these test score gains lead to gains in long-run educational attainment. Many
policy interventions that improve the short-run test scores of children have been shown to
fade out quickly after the intervention (Currie and Thomas 2000; Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims
2010; Kane and Staiger 2008), although eects on longer-term outcomes such as high school
graduation and college enrollment have been found years after an intervention has ended
(Chetty et al. 2011; Deming 2009; Krueger and Whitmore 2001; Ludwig and Miller 2007).
3 Data
Data come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panels from 1990
through 2008. To supplement the SIPP with a larger sample size, I also use the Current
Population Survey March Supplement (CPS) from 1992-2011.
3.1 SIPP
The SIPP is a nationally-representative household survey that follows households for up
to 48 months and interviews each household member about their employment, educational
attainment, and income sources. The data I use for this analysis come from pooling eight
dierent surveys from 1990{2008, which covers the years between 1990{2011. Each survey
follows households for at least 32 months, with some surveys following households up to 48
months. The short panel nature of the SIPP allows one to observe individuals living in the
11household in the rst month of the interview, and follow them throughout the survey even
if they later leave the household. Individuals living away from the household for schooling
are considered living in the household with their parents. Using the SIPP data, I examine
the educational attainment of 18-23 year olds who were living with their parents in the
rst month of the interview, evaluating their educational attainment in each March of the
survey, to coincide with the observation month of the CPS March Supplement. Outcomes
of interest include current and past college enrollment, years of schooling, and completion
of various degrees: high school, associate's and bachelor's degrees. Restricting the sample
to 18{23 year olds living with a parent in the rst month of the survey produces a sample
of 81,724 person-year observations (25,337 unique individuals). I then use characteristics
of the parents to determine which individuals are more likely to be aected by an increase
in the EITC. Specically, I consider the sample of 18{23 year olds who live in households
where neither parent in the household has schooling beyond a high school degree, a sample
of 31,130 observations. These individuals are most likely to be eligible for the EITC and
were likely eligible for the EITC throughout their childhoods.9 I refer to this group as the
`high-impact' sample. In some analyses, I also include the group of 18{23 year olds living
with college-educated parents (the `low-impact' sample) as a control for state-level trends in
educational attainment.
I focus on 18{23 year olds in this analysis because they are the `traditional' aged college
students|those that go to college right after high school. They are also the age group that
specically benets from remaining in school full-time in order to remain qualifying children
for the EITC. While this strategy of matching children to their parents in the rst month of
9Approximately 55 percent of individuals living with parents that had no schooling beyond a high school
degree were eligible for the EITC in at least one year of the SIPP survey, as determined by household income
and the number of children residing in the household. As a robustness check, some analyses were also
conducted using actual EITC eligibility in the rst year of the SIPP survey. Results are shown in Appendix
Table 1 and are qualitatively quite similar to results generated when using parental education as a proxy for
EITC-eligibility.
12the survey and following them throughout the survey allows me to capture approximately
70% of the sample of 18{23 year olds living with a parent, the individuals not observed living
with a parent are unlikely to be a random sample. Children who do not enroll in college
right after high school are less likely to live with their parents, so focusing on individuals who
live at home may overrepresent individuals enrolled in school. As this is more of a concern
among the older individuals in the sample, I also conduct additional analyses restricting the
sample to 18{20 year olds. Restricting the sample to this narrower age range allows me to
observe approximately 85% of 18{20 year olds in the SIPP.
While the SIPP survey allows for observation of individuals over time, even if they leave
the household, the survey also has limitations. Prior to the 2004 survey, the SIPP did not
have individual state identiers for a few states. Though most of the states without individual
identiers were quite small in population (e.g. Vermont and Maine), this may pose an issue
in determining who is treated by a state EITC change.10 To ensure that the results are not
unique to the sampling design of the SIPP, I also use the CPS March Supplement. The
CPS provides a much larger sample of 18{20 year olds than the SIPP|roughly six times the
number of unique individuals aged 18{20 in the SIPP.
3.2 CPS
The CPS March Supplement is a cross-sectional, nationally-representative household survey
that collects information on annual earnings from the prior calendar year. It also collects
information on demographic characteristics such as race, educational attainment and en-
10Prior to the 2004 survey, for instance, one could not distinguish between residents living in North Dakota,
South Dakota, Wyoming, or in some years, Iowa; while individuals living in Maine and Vermont were also
indisguishable. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming never implement state EITCs during this time
period, so all individuals residing in those states serve as part of the control group. Maine and Vermont
both have EITCs, and they were established at dierent points in time and are of dierent generosity levels.
Because of this, I exclude individuals who lived in either Maine or Vermont for the survey years prior to
2004. The number of individuals living in Maine and Vermont in those years was quite small, and is unlikely
to substantially impact the results.
13rollment at the time of survey. Everyone currently living in the household is surveyed, as
are individuals who usually live in the household but are currently living away for school.
In contrast to the SIPP, which follows households over time, the CPS March Supplement
observes households only once, so individuals must be living with at least one parent at the
time of interview in order to observe parental education. To coincide with the SIPP sample,
I restrict my analysis to individuals 18{20 years old at the time of the survey|a sample of
97,123 individuals, 36,063 of whom are in the high impact sample. By restricting the analysis
to individuals aged 18{20 who live with at least one parent, I observe approximately 70% of
the sample of all 18{20 year olds in the CPS.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Limiting the sample to individuals living with at least one parent captures only 70% of
the 18{23 year olds in the SIPP survey. There is some concern that this sample is not
representative of all 18{23 year olds, and that selection into the sample may confound any
eects of the EITC on educational attainment. I present summary statistics comparing
the individuals living at home and the individuals not living at home in Appendix Table
1. The individuals who do not live with at least one parent at the start of the survey are
less likely to be enrolled in school, are older, and are more likely to be women. Dierences
in the sample of individuals observed living at home and those not living at home are not
inherently problematic for the identication strategy presented here, unless the composition
of individuals living at home changes as a function of EITC changes.
To test whether the EITC aects the likelihood of living at home, I regress the likelihood
of living at home for the entire sample of individuals in each age range (regardless of whether
they live with a parent) on the maximum combined federal and state EITC in a given state
and year. Results from this exercise can be found in Appendix Table 2. Each regression
includes demographic controls, state, and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at
14the state level. The coecients displayed are the eect of the maximum federal and state
EITC on the likelihood of living at home. In the SIPP, a $1,000 increase in the EITC is
associated with a 1{1.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of living at home, but it
is only signicant at the 10% level for 18{20 year olds. In contrast, the CPS suggests that a
$1,000 increase in the EITC is associated with an insignicant 1 percentage point decline in
the likelihood of living at home. If the EITC induces more individuals to go to college, we
might expect to see a positive association between changes in the EITC and the likelihood
of living at home, but these results do not suggest that the EITC has a signicant impact
on the likelihood of living at home.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of 18{23 year olds in the SIPP living
with at least one parent at the start of the survey in the high-impact sample. I present sum-
mary statistics for individuals living in states that never implement EITCs, and states that
do implement EITCs, separately analyzing the years before and after implementation. The
last column shows the change in characteristics before and after state EITC implementation
compared to individuals living in states that never implement EITCs. Because individuals
in the control group|those living in states that never implement EITCs|never experience
a true before and after period, I construct a synthetic `pre' and `post' period to show how
characteristics vary over time. To construct the `pre' period for individuals living in states
that never implement EITCs, I reweight each observation by the share of states that do
implement EITCs that are in their pre-period in that year. For instance, for observations
in the year 1994, 20 of the 25 states that ever implement an EITC are in the pre-period,
so I weight these observations from the non-implementing states by 20/25=0.8. I use a
similar approach to construct the `post' period: I reweight each observation by the share of
EITC-implementing states that are in their post-period.
Before implementing EITCs, individuals living in states that eventually implement EITCs
have better schooling than individuals living in states that never implement EITCs. They
15are about 4 percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in college (26% compared
to 22%), have about 0.20 more years of schooling, and are about 5 percentage points more
likely to have ever enrolled in college. They are also 7 percentage points more likely to have
completed a high school degree.
Comparing the changes in characteristics before and after changes in state EITC imple-
mentation to states that never implement EITCs (last column), individuals living in states
with EITCs are about 2.5 percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in college af-
ter the implementation compared to individuals living in states that never implement EITCs.
They also have 0.10 more years of schooling, are 3 percentage points more likely to have ever
enrolled in college, and are about 1 percentage point more likely to have an associate's or
bachelor's degree.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics in the same format as Table 2 for the other samples
of interest: the 18{20 year olds from the SIPP and the 18{20 year olds from the CPS.
Changes in the outcome variables of interest are smaller among the 18{20 year olds in the
SIPP compared to the 18{23 year olds. For the 18{20 year old SIPP sample, there is a
1.5 percentage point increase in college enrollment after states implement EITCs, compared
to individuals who live in states that never implement EITCs. There is no change in the
number of years of schooling or the likelihood of having a high school degree. In contrast,
changes in educational attainment are much larger among 18{20 year olds in the CPS. After
implementing an EITC, individuals in the CPS are 4.5 percentage points more likely to be
currently enrolled in college, have about 0.10 years of schooling, are 2 percentage points more
likely to have completed high school, and are 4.5 percentage points more likely to have ever
enrolled in college, compared to individuals living in states that never implement EITCs.
The larger eects in the CPS could be due to larger sample sizes than the SIPP and thus
more precise estimates, or they could be due to potential sample selection where 18{20 year
olds in the CPS are more likely to be living at home if they are enrolled in college.
16While Table 2 and 3 indicate that state EITC implementation appears to be positively
associated with educational attainment, other demographic characteristics change as well.
The share of blacks in the 18{23 year old sample declines dramatically following state EITC
implementations, and the share of women in the sample increases. The increases in edu-
cational attainment observed may be spurious if sample characteristics change at the same
time as changes to the EITC. To address this concern, I rst compare the descriptive char-
acteristics in the SIPP to those in the CPS sample, shown in Appendix Table 3. While the
CPS conrms a decline in the black population for states after they implement EITCs, the
decline in the black population is much smaller than in the SIPP sample, and there is no
change in the share of the sample that is female.
To explicitly test whether the demographic characteristics change as a function of changes
in the state EITC benet, I separately regress each demographic control on the maximum
federal and state EITC in a given state and year controlling for state and year xed eects.
Results can be found in Appendix Table 4. Each cell is a separate regression, and the
coecients displayed illustrate the eect of a $1,000 increase in the maximum federal and
state EITC on each demographic control. The rst three columns use only the high-impact
sample, while the second three columns use children from the low-impact sample to test
whether the changes in demographic controls occur dierentially for the high-impact sample
compared to the rest of the population. Once including state and year xed eects, very
few of the demographic controls appear to change as a function of the EITC in either the
high-impact sample or in the triple-dierence analysis, alleviating some concern that changes
in education outcomes are driven by changes in the composition of the sample. However, in
the triple-dierence analysis children in the high-impact sample are signicantly less likely to
live in two-parent households when the EITC increases by $1,000, indicating that the EITC
may discourage marriage among the low-educated population11 For all other demographic
11The relationship between the EITC and marriage has been examined, although there is little evidence
17controls, the triple-dierence analysis conrms that there is very little change in observable
characteristics associated with changes in the EITC. I discuss alternative specications to
address sample selection concerns in more detail after discussing the main results.
4 Empirical Method
To analyze how the EITC aects the educational attainment of children from low-educated
families, I employ a series of dierence-in-dierences estimators that examine the changes in
high school graduation rates, years of schooling, college enrollment, and degree completion
following changes in state EITC benets. I create a treatment variable equal to the maximum
combined federal and state EITC that a household with two children could receive in a
given state and year.12 All individuals in the analysis are assigned this value, which can
be thought of as the maximum potential EITC benet for an individual living in a given
state in a particular year. For instance, in the 2011 tax year, the maximum federal EITC
for a household with two children was $5,112. Individuals living in Washington, DC for the
2011 tax year were also eligible for an additional $2,045 (DC had an EITC worth 40% of the
federal EITC in 2011), so the maximum combined federal and state EITC for a household
with two or more children was $7,157 in Washington, DC in 2011. All values were then
adjusted for ination and reported in year 2011 dollars, using the consumer price index.
For changes in educational attainment to be due to changes in EITC benets, I assume
that the timing of state EITC expansions are uncorrelated with other state-level factors that
may also aect educational attainment. For instance, if states are more likely to increase
their EITC benets when there is high unemployment, and high unemployment also induces
more individuals to enroll in college, changes in education outcomes will reect not only
that the EITC signicantly alters marriage behavior, see Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002).
12I use the maximum benets for a two-child household rather than the maximum benet for the actual
number of children in a particular household to avoid issues of endogeneity of family structure to EITC
policy changes.
18the eect of a change in state EITC benets, but also the eect of high unemployment on
educational attainment.
To test whether state EITCs are correlated with other macroeconomic indicators, I regress
the maximum federal and state EITC on other state characteristics such as state-by-year
GDP, minimum wage, and unemployment rate. Results (shown in Table 4) indicate that
there is a negative correlation between the state EITC and the log minimum wage, signicant
at the p<0.05 level. If states that increase their EITCs have lower minimum wages, this
would lower the opportunity cost of enrolling in college, and should therefore increase the
number of individuals enrolling in college. Not controlling for the minimum wage in a state
would overestimate the eects of the EITC on educational attainment. Once including all
states, regardless of whether they implement EITCs, a $1,000 increase in the EITC is still
negatively associated with the minimum wage, but only at the p<0.10 level. In all of my
analyses, I include state-by-year macroeconomic indicators.
I begin by examining the eects of the maximum federal and state EITC on individuals
in the high-impact sample only, comparing outcomes of individuals living in states after an
increase in the EITC by $1,000 to outcomes of individuals who lived in states before the
increase occurred, relative to changes in outcomes among individuals in the untreated states.
Using linear regression models, I estimate equations of the following form:
Yi;s;t = Xi;s;t + Zs + Vs;t + Wt + EITCs;t + i (1)
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states, and t indexes years. Yi;s;t is the outcome
variable of interest: college enrollment, high school completion, years of schooling, and de-
gree completion; Xi;s;t is a vector of personal characteristics that includes age, race, gender,
number of male and female siblings living in the household, how many times the respondent
appears in the sample (up to 4), and whether both parents are living in the household.
19Vs;t includes state-by-year economic indicators including the minimum wage and the unem-
ployment rate. Zs and Wt are state and year xed eects, respectively. State xed eects
control for time-invariant state-level characteristics, such as political ideology. Year xed
eects control for changes that aect all states such as the federal unemployment rate, or
expansions to the federal EITC.13 Both of these xed eects are identied because not all
states implement or change EITCs at the same time. EITCs;t is the maximum federal and
state combined EITC benet in a given state and year for a household with two children,
in thousands of dollars. The coecient on this term identies within-state changes in the
outcome variables of interest associated with a $1,000 change in the state EITC benet.
States that never implement EITCs may not be an adequate comparison group for states
with their own EITC benets. While there is considerable variation in the timing of state
EITC changes, there may be other changes in state-level policies that occur at the same time
as changes to state EITCs that aect all college-aged individuals, which would confound the
eects of the EITC on educational attainment. For instance, Table 2 indicated that the
share of women in the EITC-implementing states increased following state EITC implemen-
tation. If there are secular increases in female college enrollment in states that have EITCs,
comparing outcomes of individuals in states that have EITCs to outcomes of individuals
in states that do not have EITCs may generate a spurious association between the EITC
and education outcomes. State xed eects do not adequately address this concern because
they only control for time-invariant characteristics particular to each state. In another set
of analyses, I use a series of triple dierence models to provide a dierent counterfactual for
EITC-eligible children in states that implement EITCs. In this set of analyses, I include all
individuals, regardless of their parents' educational attainment, and compare the outcomes
of children in the high-impact sample to those of children not likely to be aected by changes
in the EITC|those living in highly-educated households. This model will take a very simi-
13The federal EITC was expanded for two-child households gradually from 1991 to 1996.
20lar form to (1), but will include individuals from the low-impact sample to control for other
state-level trends in education outcomes. This model will include an indicator for whether
the respondent is in the high-impact sample, as well as an interaction of the maximum EITC
with whether the respondent is in the high-impact sample:
Yi;s;t = Xi;s;t+Zs+Vs;t+Wt+1EITCs;t+2ELGi;s;t+3EITCs;tELGi;s;t+i (2)
where ELGi;s;t is equal to one if the individual lives in a household where neither par-
ent has schooling beyond a high school degree, and zero otherwise. 3 represents the key
independent variable of interest: the dierence in the outcome variable between children in
the high-impact sample (those with low-educated parents) and the low-impact sample (those
with highly-educated parents) associated with a $1,000 increase in potential EITC benets.
It is worth noting that some individuals in the low-impact sample did live in households
where their annual income placed them in the EITC-eligibility range, so some of these in-
dividuals may have actually received the EITC.14 Estimates from these regressions may be
thought of as a lower-bound, as some individuals in the comparison group may also benet
from the credit.
To address concerns that secular trends in educational attainment among individuals
living in states that have EITCs may cause spurious associations between EITC changes and
educational attainment, Figure 5 plots an event study of the eect of the maximum federal
and state EITC on changes in the outcomes of interest for the years leading up to, and
following the state EITC implementation. The coecient plotted is the triple-interaction of
the maximum federal and state EITC benet with an indicator for being in the high-impact
sample, for each year before and after implementation. Before state EITC implementation,
14Approximately twenty percent of the sample of individuals in the low-impact sample were eligible for
the EITC as determined by their household income and the number of children residing in the household.
21the maximum federal and state EITC is the same as the maximum federal EITC alone, and
is identied because states implement EITCs in dierent calendar years. Following state
EITC implementation, interacting the maximum federal and state EITC with time-since-
implementation indicators illustrates the eects of within-state changes in the generosity
of EITC benets on changes in the outcome variables for each year since implementation.
Each graph represents a separate regression|one for each outcome of interest. All regressions
include demographic controls, state xed eects, and year xed eects. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. The lighter gray bars represent the 95% condence intervals.
Each graph is limited to the 10 years before and after state EITC implementation, as there
are few states that have more than 10 years of either a pre- or post-implementation window.
The year before implementation is omitted as the reference category. The graphs show little
evidence of pre-trends in any of the outcomes of interest as a function of EITC generosity,
although condence intervals are quite large, and often do not rule out eects of zero post-
implementation.15
5 Results
Table 5 shows results from models (1) and (2) for each outcome variable of interest. Edu-
cation outcomes are evaluated as a function of the maximum federal and state EITC in a
given year and state. The top panel presents the coecient  from (1), while the bottom
panel presents the coecient on the interaction term 3 from (2). The coecient can be in-
terpreted as the change in the outcome variable of interest associated with a $1,000 increase
in the maximum federal and state EITC benet. All models include state and year xed
eects. The rst column shows results with no other demographic controls, while the second
15I have also conducted an event-study analysis using the CPS, which provides a larger sample size and
more precision in estimating time trends. An analogous gure 6 for the CPS can be found in Appendix
Figure 1. Results look quite similar to those found in the SIPP, but suggest signicant increases in the
outcomes of interest in the years following state EITC implementation.
22column adds demographic characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the state level,
allowing for correlation of the error term for individuals living in the same state. From left
to right, The rst panel shows results for the 18{23 year olds in the SIPP, the second panel
shows results for 18{20 year olds in the SIPP, and the third panel shows results for 18{20
year olds in the CPS.
Results from the top panel indicate that current and past college enrollment rates in-
creased among 18{23 year olds in the high-impact sample as the maximum EITC benet
increased, as did years of schooling, and high school graduation rates. None of these ef-
fects are statistically signicant without the demographic controls (column 1), but eects
on years of schooling, high school graduation, and the likelihood of ever enrolling in college
all increase and become statistically signicant once demographic controls are included in
column 2. After including demographic controls (column 2), 18{23 year olds are 6 percent
more likely to be enrolled in college (a 1.5 percentage point increase on a base of 26 percent)
and 7 percent more likely to have ever enrolled in college (2.7 percentage point increase on a
base of 41 percent). Smaller eects can be seen for years of schooling, which increased by 1
percent (0.11 of a year increase on a base of 11.97 years), and high school completion, which
increased by 3 percent (2.3 percentage point gain on a base of 70 percent). The results on
college enrollment are smaller than eects found elsewhere in the literature (Abraham and
Clark 2006; Dynarski 2003), which suggest that a $1,000 increase in nancial aid is associ-
ated with a 3 percentage point increase in college enrollment. The results presented here are
about half that size, but a 95% condence interval includes a 4 percentage point increase
in current college enrollment among 18{23 year olds following an increase in the EITC of
$1,000.
Eects are slightly smaller but less precisely estimated for the samples of 18{20 year
olds in the SIPP and the CPS. Results from regressions including demographic controls
along with state and year xed eects for the 18-20 year olds suggest that individuals are
231.7 percentage points more likely to be currently enrolled in college and are 2.7 percentage
points more likely to have ever enrolled in college. Only the eects on college enrollment are
signicant in these models. For the CPS results, I nd no signicant eects of the EITC on
education outcomes, though point estimates are also quite similar to those in the SIPP.
Results from the top panel of Table 5 indicate that individuals who live in states with
EITCs are more likely to nish high school and go on to college. While these eects could be
due to the changes in the EITC, it is also possible that other, state-specic changes may be
occurring at the same time as changes in the EITC that aect all teens. To control for other
state-specic factors, I next include all of the individuals living with at least one parent in
the beginning of the survey, regardless of the education of their parents. Individuals who
live in households with at least one parent who has any college experience are less likely to
receive the EITC, and should therefore be less aected by changes in the value of the state
EITC. Including these individuals in the analysis will control for other trends that may be
occurring in states at the same time as changes in the EITC.
The coecient presented in the bottom panel of Table 5 is 3 from (2). It represents the
change in the outcome variable of interest associated with a $1,000 increase in the combined
federal and state EITC for individuals in the high-impact sample, compared to those in
the low-impact sample and to those who never experience a $1,000 increase in the EITC.
Including the low-impact sample as a control group for other state-level changes increases
the precision of the estimates. Including demographic controls and state and year xed
eects (column 2), 18{23 year olds in the high-impact sample are 0.7 percentage points
more likely to be enrolled in college and are 1.1 percentage points more likely to have ever
enrolled in college. These eects are smaller than those found for the high-impact sample
only, indicating that either there are other changes in the states that implement EITCs that
aect the education outcomes of all individuals in the state, or that some of the individuals in
the low-impact sample may actually be receiving the EITC as well. If that is the case, these
24estimates can be thought of as a lower-bound, as some of the individuals in the low-impact
sample may also benet from the increases in the EITC. Results from the triple-dierence
analysis are also quite similar across the three samples. Eects are largest in the CPS
sample (though not statistically signicantly dierent from the SIPP), which may reect
sample selection due to the types of individuals likely to be living at home in the CPS. In
the CPS, 18{20 year olds are 1.8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college,
1.5 percentage points more likely to have a high school degree, and 2 percentage points
more likely to have ever enrolled in college. As results from equation (2) are more precisely
estimated and reect a lower-bound on the eects of the EITC on educational attainment,
I will focus on the triple-dierence specication for all following results.16
Turning to results for degree completion, Table 6 shows results only for the 18{23 year
olds in the SIPP, since almost no one in the 18{20 year old sample has either an associate's
degree or a bachelor's degree. Results indicate that there is no eect of the EITC on the
likelihood of completing an associate's degree, but there is a small, 0.3 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of completing a bachelor's degree associated with a $1,000 increase
in the EITC. While this eect is quite small, it represents a large change in percentage
terms. Just 3% of the high-impact sample has a bachelor's degree prior to state EITC
implementation, so this result represents a 10% increase in the share of bachelor's degree
holders.
5.1 Heterogenous treatment eects
Table 7 presents dierences in results by gender, family structure, and race. Results indicate
that eects are larger and more signicant among women, children living with a single parent,
and blacks. While point estimates for men are somewhat similar to those for women, I only
obtain signicant results for women. Following an increase in the EITC by $1,000, women
16All following results from equation (1) are available upon request.
25are 0.8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college, and 1.5 percentage points more
likely to have ever enrolled in college. Similarly, children living with only one parent are 1.6
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and 2.5 percentage points more likely
to have ever enrolled in college following an increase in the EITC by $1,000. Approximately
75% of all EITC claims come from single-headed households, so even though children from
single-parent households tend to be at a disadvantage economically, we would expect that
changes in the EITC would primarly aect children from single-headed households. Finally,
eects are also more signicant for black children. Following an increase in the EITC by
$1,000, black children are 1.5 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and 2.5
percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled in college.17
To address the question of whether the EITC increases college enrollment by providing
a conditional cash transfer to college-aged children or through increasing household income
when children are young, I next examine how eects of the maximum EITC vary depending
on how old the respondent was at the time of state EITC implementation.18 Because of
the variation in timing of state EITC implementation, some individuals are exposed to the
EITC for more years of their childhood. Depending on how old the individual was when the
state implemented an EITC, some individuals may have beneted from many years of added
EITC income. Figure 6 plots the eects of the maximum EITC by how old the 18{23 year
olds in the SIPP were when the EITC was implemented in their state. If the EITC works
through improving the schooling of children when young, we would expect to nd larger
eects for individuals who were younger when the EITC was implemented in their state.
If instead, the EITC helps alleviate short-term credit constraints in paying for college, we
17Approximately half of the 18{23 year olds in my sample living with only one parent were eligible for
the EITC in the rst year of the SIPP compared to 20% of those living with both parents. Similarly for
black families|approximatelyl 45% of black children were eligible for the EITC in the rst year of the SIPP
sample, compared to 25% of children in non-black families.
18Information about cross-state moves are rather limited in the SIPP, so I assume that the current state of
residence was constant throughout an individual's life. Very few individuals move across states throughout
the course of the SIPP panel.
26would expect to nd little variation in the eects of the EITC by age.
The coecient plotted in Figure 6 is the triple interaction of the maximum EITC with an
indicator for being in the high-impact sample for each age group illustrated. All individuals
who were living in a state that implemented an EITC after they turned 23 were grouped
together, and the reference category is individuals living in states that never implemented
EITCs. There is a clear, negative association between age at time of implementation and
educational attainment. The largest eects can be seen for individuals who were less than 12
at the time of implementation, and no results, or negative results can be seen for individuals
who were 23 or older. This implies that individuals who were exposed to a state EITC for
more years of their childhood are more likely to have positive education outcomes, indicating
that the EITC does work through improving the schooling of children when they are young.
While many of the outcomes are still signicant and positive for individuals who were 12{17
or 18{22 when their state implemented an EITC, these graphs suggest that eects are larger
for the individuals exposed to the EITC for more years of their childhood.19
Lastly, if one of the mechanisms driving increases in educational attainment is the added
EITC benet a household would receive if their child remained in school past age 18, we
would expect dierent responses to the EITC based on the number of children living in the
household. Prior to the 2009 tax year, households could only claim up to two children for
the EITC|more than two children did not increase the benet amount. After 2008, families
could claim up to three children, so that having a third child both increased the replacement
rate on earnings, and the maximum potential benet. Beyond three children, there is no
added EITC benet for additional children. Therefore we would expect to nd smaller or no
responses in college enrollment among households with four or more children since keeping a
fourth child in college does not increase the value of the household EITC benet. In Figure
19Appendix Figure 2 shows the same exercise using the CPS sample of 18{20 year olds. Results using the
CPS conrm the results from the SIPP and indicate a stronger, negative association between age at EITC
implementation and education outcomes.
277, I show how the likelihood of ever enrolling in college varies by the number of children
under 24 (including the respondent) living in the household at the start of the SIPP survey.
Here, regressions were estimated separately by gender for each household size. Results in
Figure 7 show that eects of a $1,000 increase in the maximum EITC on ever enrolling in
college are only signicant for households with one or two children. There are relatively few
households with four or more children, so the estimates are not precise enough to rule out
larger eects for households with four or more children compared to one child, but the trend
certainly appears to be a declining eect of the EITC on college enrollment for households
with more children. This supports the hypothesis that eects should be concentrated among
households with fewer children, since each additional child up to three children garners a
higher household EITC benet but households with more than three children do not receive
a higher benet than households with exactly three children.
5.2 Robustness checks
Up until now, I have used parents' education as a proxy for EITC-eligibility, as is done in
much of the EITC literature. Education is often used as a proxy for EITC-eligibility to
avoid issues of endogeneity of own income to policy changes. While it is more dicult to
change your educational attainment than your household income in conjunction with EITC
policy expansions, there may be some concern that the sample of individuals in the high-
impact sample changes as a function of state EITC benet changes. I address this concern
in Appendix Table 5, by testing the relationship between the likelihood of being in the
high-impact sample and EITC benet changes. Including both the high-impact sample and
the low-impact sample, I regress an indicator for being in the high-impact sample on the
maximum federal and state EITC in a given year along with state and year xed eects.
For all of the samples of interest|18{23 year olds from the SIPP, 18{20 year olds from the
SIPP, and 18{20 year olds from the CPS|individuals are slightly less likely to be in the
28high-impact sample when the state EITC increases by $1,000. Results are only signicant for
the 18{20 year olds in the CPS, and suggest that a $1,000 increase in the EITC is associated
with a 2 percentage point decline in the likelihood of being in the high-impact sample. This
suggests that some parents may be using the EITC to improve their own education, which
would lead to an underestimation of the true eect of the EITC changes on educational
attainment. If parents complete some college as a result of the EITC, they are no longer in
the `treated' sample I present here, and thus the remaining individuals in the high-impact
sample will likely be a more disadvantaged group of families.20
To illustrate that parental education serves as a good proxy for EITC eligibility, I replicate
the analysis presented in the bottom panel of Table 5 using actual eligibility for the EITC as
the criterion for being in the high-impact sample. Results are presented in Appendix Table
6. Using actual eligibility for the EITC generates larger eects for years of schooling and
high school graduation than using parents' education as the denition of eligibility. While
the results in Table 5 for the triple-dierence analysis showed no signicant increase in high
school graduation rates, using actual eligibility nds that individuals are about 1 percentage
point more likely to graduate from high school following an increase in the EITC by $1,000.
Results for college enrollment are somewhat comparable to those found in Table 5: following
a $1,000 increase in the EITC, individuals are about 1 percentage point more likely to have
ever enrolled in college.
To further alleviate concern that results are due to dierential sample selection as a
function of changes in state EITC benets, I implement several alternative specications
to the models presented thus far. To further control for changes in educational attainment
trends within states over time, I estimate a version of equation (2) that includes state-specic
linear time trends. This will account for secular trends in educational attainment that occur
20Similar ndings of increased educational attainment among non-traditional aged students due to tax-
based nancial aid have been found in the literature, e.g. (LaLumia 2012; Seftor and Turner 2002).
29monotonically within states over time. Since there was some evidence that demographic
characteristics changed in the high-impact sample following state EITC implementation, I
also estimate a version of (2) that includes two sets of interactions: one set of interactions
of the demographic characteristics with the EITC treatment variable, which will allow the
eects of demographic characteristics to change as a function of EITC changes; and a set of
interactions of the demographic characteristics with an indicator for being in the high-impact
sample, which will allow the eects of demographic characteristics to dier for individuals in
the low-impact sample and individuals in the high-impact sample. Results of this exercise
can be found in Appendix Table 7, and are quite similar to the results presented for the
triple-dierence analysis in Table 5.
To further address concerns of sample selection, I employ two nal strategies: rst, I
include all of the individuals not living with a parent at the start of the survey in the high-
impact sample to test whether results are driven by changes in who is observed in the sample
as a function of EITC benet changes. Finally, I also conduct an analysis restricting the
sample of 18{23 year olds to those who were younger than 19 at the start of the survey. Of
individuals who were younger than 19 at the start of the survey, approximately 88% of them
were living with at least one parent. This reduces the sample selection problem by capturing
a more representative sample of individuals. Results from these exercises can be found in
Appendix Tables 8 and 9.
By including all of the individuals not living with a parent as part of the high-impact
sample, I nd larger eects of the EITC on educational attainment. Following an increase
in the EITC by $1,000, 18{23 year olds in the high-impact sample are 1.4 percentage points
more likely to be enrolled in college, earn 0.05 more years of schooling, are 0.6 percentage
points more likely to complete high school, and are 2.3 percentage points more likely to
have ever enrolled in college. Results are also larger and more statistically signicant for the
18{20 year olds in the SIPP and the 18{20 year olds in the CPS.
30Finally, Appendix Table 9 shows results when I restrict the sample to 18{23 year olds
who were younger than 19 at the time of the survey and living with at least one parent in
the rst month of the SIPP. These results are a bit smaller than those found in Table 5 but
also less precisely-estimated. Following a $1,000 increase in the EITC, individuals in the
high-impact sample are 0.7 percentage points more likely to complete high school and are
0.7 percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled in college, compared to individuals
in the low-impact sample. All of these robustness checks present similar results to those
reported in Table 5, suggesting that eects are not solely due to sample selection issues or
the denition of EITC-eligibility.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eect of household income on the educational attainment of children
from low-educated households. Using variation in both the timing of implementation and
generosity of state-level EITC benets, I have shown that increasing state EITC benets sig-
nicantly increases the educational attainment of children who grow up with low-educated
parents. After an increase in EITC benets by $1,000, 18{23 year olds gain about 0.11 years
of schooling, are 2.3 percentage points more likely to have completed high school, and are
2.7 percentage points more likely to have ever enrolled in college, compared to children who
live in states that do not implement EITCs. Results are qualitatively quite similar among
18-20 year olds from the SIPP and CPS. Controlling for state-level trends in education out-
comes using children from highly-educated backgrounds produces somewhat smaller, more
precisely-estimated positive eects. 18{23 year olds growing up in low-educated households
are 0.7 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college and are 1.1 percentage points
more likely to have ever enrolled in college compared to individuals from highly-educated
households. While few individuals in this sample complete a bachelor's degree (3% of 18{
3123 year olds in states that implement EITCs), I nd a 10% increase in the likelihood of
completing a bachelor's degree associated with a $1,000 increase in the EITC. In assessing
dierences by subgroups, I nd that results are more signicant for women, individuals who
grow up in single-parent households, and black children.
In assessing whether the EITC works to improve the education outcomes of children
by providing short-run increases to household income during college-going years or through
increases in household income when children are young, I nd evidence that eects are largest
for children who were exposed to a state EITC before age 12. This suggests that the EITC
improves the educational attainment of children growing up in low-educated households
by increasing household income throughout their lives. This supports previous research
examining the test scores of children of EITC-recipients (Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko
2011; Dahl and Lochner 2012). The estimates in this analysis are slightly larger than the
0.3 percentage point increase in college enrollment found by Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko
(2011), but may reect dierences in identication strategy. Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko
(2011) estimate the eects of the EITC on college enrollment solely through a one-year
increase in test scores. My estimates suggest that the may EITC increase college enrollment
through more channels than just test scores (e.g. through conditional cash transfers to
college-aged children).
This analysis has shown that, in addition to more traditional forms of nancial aid, the
EITC may be a good source of nancial aid for low-income families to send their children
to college. The EITC is a wide-reaching program that aects a large share of families in the
United States. Recent estimates suggest that fully half of all households with children will
claim the EITC at some point over an 18 year period (Horowitz and Dowd 2011). I nd
evidence that the EITC helps children enroll in college and complete more years of schooling,
which supports previous research linking the EITC to higher test scores among low-income
children (Dahl and Lochner 2012). This provides further evidence that the EITC not only
32works to lift families out of poverty for the current generation, but also provides hope of
upward mobility for future generations of children growing up in low-educated households.
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38Year of 
Implementation
Benefit Level in year of 
implementation (as a percent 
of federal benefit)
Benefit Level as of 2011 tax 
year (as a percent of federal 
benefit)
Rhode Island 1986 22.2 25
Vermont 1988 23 32
Wisconsin
1 1989 75 34
Iowa 1990 5 7
Minnesota
2 1991 10 45
New York 1994 7.5 30
Massachusetts 1997 10 15
Oregon 1997 5 6
Kansas 1998 10 18
Maryland 1998 10 25
Colorado 1999 8.5 0
DC 2000 10 40
Illinois 2000 5 5
Maine 2000 5 5
New Jersey 2000 10 20
Oklahoma 2002 5 5
Indiana 2003 6 9
Nebraska 2003 8 10
Delaware 2006 20 20
Virginia 2006 20 20
New Mexico 2007 8 10
North Carolina 2008 3.5 5
Michigan 2008 10 20
Louisiana 2008 3.5 3.5
Connecticut 2011 30 30
Table 1. States with Earned Income Tax Credits, year of implementation, benefit level at implementation, and 
in 2011 tax year (as a percent of federal EITC)
source: Tax Policy Center http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=293
1: Wisconsin has a system based on the number of children in the household. Rate shown here is for 
households with 3 or more children.
2: Minnesota has a system based on whether there are any children living in the household, and after 1997, 
household earnings. Rate shown here is for households with children and the maximum possible rate given 
income.Difference 
in 
differences
Currently enrolled in college 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.024
(.417) (.436) (.42) (.452) (.011)
Years of schooling 11.79 11.97 11.80 12.08 0.096
(1.579) (1.605) (1.456) (1.482) (.032)
Has a high school degree 0.63 0.70 0.65 0.71 -0.001
(.482) (.459) (.478) (.453) (.009)
Ever enrolled in college 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.029
(.48) (.491) (.477) (.495) (.008)
Has at least an associate's degree 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.010
(.177) (.2) (.223) (.258) (.007)
Has at least a bachelor's degree 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.011
(.136) (.165) (.12) (.184) (.005)
Black 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.15 -0.068
(.387) (.425) (.372) (.357) (.008)
Other 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.014
(.239) (.191) (.265) (.25) (.005)
Female 0.45 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.054
(.498) (.496) (.499) (.5) (.011)
Age 20.00 20.21 19.98 20.16 -0.026
(.988) (1.672) (1.646) (1.663) (.037)
Maximum federal and state EITC (in 1,000s of 
2011$ ) 3.606 3.214 4.845 5.793 1.340
(1.411) (1.362) (.85) (1.07) (16.52)
Number of male siblings in the household 0.753 0.612 0.746 0.639 0.034
(.988) (.827) (.941) (.892) (.019)
Number of female siblings in the household 0.636 0.532 0.687 0.608 0.026
(.889) (.813) (.924) (.868) (.018)
Living with both parents 0.656 0.647 0.608 0.622 0.023
(.475) (.478) (.488) (.485) (.01)
Number of Observations 16,507     7,806     17,271    5,642     
Note: Individuals who live in states that never implement EITCs serve as the comparison group; synthetic 'pre' ('post') 
period constructed by re-weighting observations in each year to correspond to the share of EITC-implementing states in 
the 'pre' ('post') period in the given year. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics before and after state EITC implementation, relative to individuals who live in states that 
never implement EITCs, 18-23 year olds living with at least one parent at the beginning of the survey and neither parent 
has more than a high school degree
Never state 
EITC "pre"
Pre-state 
EITC
Never state 
EITC "post"
Post-state 
EITC
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old 
children living with at least one parent in the first month of the survey, neither parent has schooling beyond a high school 
degree.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one 
parent at interview, has schooling beyond a high school degree. SIPP 18-20 year olds
Difference 
in 
differences
Currently enrolled in college 0.232 0.281 0.238 0.303 0.016
(.004) (.007) (.004) (.008) (.014)
Years of schooling 11.55 11.72 11.60 11.77 0.000
(.015) (.021) (.013) (.022) (.032)
Has a high school degree 0.532 0.592 0.564 0.614 -0.009
(.005) (.007) (.005) (.008) (.013)
Ever enrolled in college 0.311 0.364 0.301 0.371 0.017
(.005) (.007) (.004) (.008) (.009)
Number of Observations 10,419     4,628    10,908    3,489   
 CPS 18-20 Year Olds
Difference 
in 
differences
Currently enrolled in college 0.221 0.258 0.230 0.313 0.045
(.003) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.006)
Years of schooling 11.51 11.61 11.55 11.73 0.088
(.009) (.017) (.009) (.016) (.017)
Has a high school degree 0.538 0.580 0.546 0.605 0.018
(.004) (.006) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Ever enrolled in college 0.290 0.328 0.297 0.382 0.046
(.003) (.006) (.003) (.005) (.006)
Number of Observations 19,884     6,860    19,884    8,628   
Note: Individuals who live in states that never implement EITCs serve as the comparison 
group; synthetic 'pre' ('post') period constructed by re-weighting observations in each year to 
correspond to the share of EITC-implementing states in the 'pre' ('post') period in the given 
year. Standard errors in parentheses.
Never state 
EITC "pre"
Pre-state 
EITC
Never state 
EITC "post"
Post-state 
EITC
Never state 
EITC "pre"
Pre-state 
EITC
Never state 
EITC "post"
Post-state 
EITC
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 
2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at least one parent in the first month of the 
survey, neither parent has schooling beyond a high school degree.  Current Population Survey 
March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent at 
interview, has schooling beyond a high school degree. 
Table 3. Means of outcome variables of interest for individuals living with their parents at the 
beginning of the survey and neither parent has more than a high school degree, before and after 
state EITC implementation relative to states that never implement EITCs, by data sourceTable 4. Test for exogeneity of State EITC benefits
Dependent Variable:
Maximum Federal and 
State EITC in year t (in 
thousands of 2011 dollars)
Maximum Federal and 
State EITC in year t (in 
thousands of 2011 
Log state GDP per capita 0.232 0.731
(1.217) (.66)
Unemployment Rate (*100) -0.069 -0.004
(.041) (.023)
Log real minimum wage -0.443 ** -0.207 *
(.209) (.12)
State Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Number of Observations 480 891
States that ever implement 
EITCs All States
Source: Statistics on state-level unemployment rates, state-level GDP, and state-level minimum 
wage from 1990-2011. *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10High-impact sample
No 
controls W/controls
No 
controls W/controls
No 
controls W/controls
Outcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.014   0.015   0.017   0.017   0.010   0.010  
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Years of Schooling 0.089   0.107 ** 0.013   0.021   0.045   0.040  
(0.075) (0.051) (0.064) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052)
High school graduate 0.016   0.023 * 0.009   0.007   0.010   0.007  
(0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Ever enrolled in college 0.022   0.027 ** 0.027   0.027 * 0.024   0.023  
(0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Demographic Controls N Y N Y N Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 31,130     31,130          19,285     19,285          36,063     36,063        
 *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Triple-Difference
No 
controls W/controls
No 
controls W/controls
No 
controls W/controls
Outcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.006 * 0.007 ** 0.009 ** 0.010 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 ***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Years of Schooling 0.020   0.026 * 0.017   0.021 * 0.050 *** 0.049 ***
(.015) (.014) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.01)
High school graduate 0.001   0.003   0.004   0.005 * 0.016 *** 0.015 ***
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.004)
Ever enrolled in college 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 ** 0.010 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 ***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Demographic Controls N Y N Y N Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 81,724     81,724          51,374     51,374          97,123     97,123        
 *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
  
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell. SIPP outcomes evaluated in each 
March of the survey. Coefficient in top panel is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year (in thousands of dollars, 2011$), coefficient in 
bottom panel is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the individual lives in a household where 
neither parent has more than a high school degree. Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in the 
household, whether both parents are present in the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times, SIPP 
sample only), state-level unemployment rate, and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Table 5. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational outcomes of individuals living with at least one parent in the first 
month of the survey. By data source.
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at least one 
parent in the first month of the survey.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one 
parent at interview. 
SIPP 18-23 year olds SIPP 18-20 year olds CPS 18-20 year olds
SIPP 18-23 year olds CPS 18-20 year olds SIPP 18-20 year oldsNo 
controls W/controls
Outcome variable
Has at least an associate's degree -0.002   -0.001  
(0.002) (0.002)
Has at least a bachelor's degree 0.003 * 0.003 *
(0.001) (0.002)
Demographic Controls N Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y
Number of Observations 81,724     81,724        
 *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living 
with at least one parent in the first month of the survey. 
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented 
in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell.  SIPP outcomes 
evaluated in each March of the survey.Coefficient is maximum federal 
and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for 
whether the individual lives in a household where neither parent has 
more than a high school degree. Demographic controls include gender, 
race, number of male and female siblings living in the household, 
whether both parents are present in the household, a control for 
number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times), 
state-level unemployment rate, and minimum wage.  *** indicates 
significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Table 6. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on 
degree attainment of 18-23 year olds living with their parents in the 
first month of the survey. Outcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.006   0.008 * 0.002   0.016 *** 0.005   0.014 **
(.005) (.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
Years of Schooling 0.028   0.023   0.014   0.046   0.024   0.033  
(.017) (.017) (0.016) (0.028) (0.015) (0.027)
High school graduate 0.004   0.001   0.002   0.006   0.003   0.005  
(.004) (.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
Ever enrolled in college 0.008   0.015 *** 0.006   0.024 *** 0.008 ** 0.024 ***
(.005) (.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 43,280     38,444   58,740     22,984     69,932     11,792    
 *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell. Outcomes 
from the SIPP evaluated in each March of the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year (in 
thousands of dollars, 2011$) interacted with indicator for living in a household where neither parent has schooling beyond a high 
school degree. Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in the household, whether 
both parents are present in the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times, SIPP 
only), state-level unemployment rate, and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Both parents Single Parent Non-Black Black Men Women
Table 7. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational outcomes of 18-23 year olds living with at least 
one parent in the first month of the SIPP survey. Differences by gender, family structure, and race
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds living with 
at least one parent in the first month of the survey. 
Differences by gender Differences by family structure Differences by raceFigure 1. Number of states with EITCs, by calendar year 
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  Figure 2. Maximum federal and state EITC by  time to state EITC implementation, in thousands of dollars (2011$) 
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 Figure 3. Maximum federal and state EITC by calendar year, in thousands of dollars (2011$) 
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 Figure 4. EITC tax schedule for 2011, single-headed households by number of children and earnings 
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 Figure 5. Effect of EITC on outcomes, by time since state EITC implementation; 10 years before and after implementation, relative to 
states that never implement;18-23 year olds in the SIPP (triple-difference) 
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c)  Likelihood of having a high school degree         d)   Likelihood of ever enrolling in college Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. 18-23 year olds living with at 
least one parent at the start of the survey. 
Note: Graph of the effect of the maximum EITC interacted with an indicator for being in the high impact sample on the outcome indicated 
below each graph for individuals by years until (since) state EITC implementation, relative to states that never implement EITCs. Effects 
normalized to zero in the year before implementation. Graphs generated from linear regressions that include basic demographic 
characteristics: race, age, gender, number of siblings living in the household, an indicator for whether both parents live in the household, 
and number of times included in the sample. State unemployment rate and minimum wage also included. State and year fixed effects 
included in all models, standard errors clustered at the state level.  95% confidence intervals indicated with lighter grey lines.    
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Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. 18-23 year olds living with at 
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Figure 7. Effect of maximum EITC in a given state and year on likelihood of ever enrolling in college for high-impact sample 
relative to low-impact sample, by number of children under age 24 living in the household, 18-23 year olds in the SIPP 
 
 Currently enrolled in college 40.5% 18.3% 42.3% 21.9% 40.7% 23.9%
(.491) (.386) (.002) (.414) (.002) (.002)
Years of Schooling 12.38 12.20 12.04 11.64 11.94 11.64
(1.512) (2.003) (.006) (1.735) (.004) (.008)
Has a high school degree 76.5% 77.0% 67.2% 64.6% 65.5% 66.5%
(.424) (.421) (.002) (.478) (.002) (.002)
Ever enrolled in college 57.3% 45.7% 50.8% 35.2% 49.0% 35.5%
(.495) (.498) (.002) (.478) (.002) (.002)
Has at least an Associate's degree 8.5% 12.6% 1.6% 2.8% 1.2% 2.1%
(.278) (.332) (.001) (.164) (.) (.001)
Has at least a Bachelor's degree 5.1% 7.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.4%
(.22) (.265) (.) (.067) (.) (.)
Black 14.5% 13.6% 14.4% 16.6% 13.9% 18.6%
(.352) (.343) (.002) (.372) (.001) (.002)
Other 6.0% 5.4% 6.2% 5.9% 6.1% 7.0%
(.238) (.226) (.001) (.235) (.001) (.001)
Female 45.9% 58.7% 47.3% 59.4% 45.7% 57.9%
(.498) (.492) (.002) (.491) (.002) (.002)
Age 20.09 21.33 18.94 19.25 18.88 19.21
(1.646) (1.546) (.004) (.795) (.003) (.004)
State EITC amount ( as percentage of 
federal benefit) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
(1.08) (.103) (.) (.104) (.) (.)
Number of Observations 81,724    37,759    51,374    11,951    97,123      42,260     
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds. Current 
Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, 18-20 year olds.
 Appendix Table 1. Descriptive statistics by whether the individuals resides with at least one parent at the time of interview, by 
data source
SIPP 18-23 year olds SIPP 18-20 year olds CPS 18-20 year olds
Living with 
at least one 
parent
Not living 
with a parent
Living with 
at least one 
parent
Not living 
with a parent
Living with at 
least one 
parent
Not living with 
a parentOutcome variable= Living with at least 
one parent at start of interview
Maximum federal and state EITC (in 
thousands of 2000 dollars) 0.009   0.014 * -0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Number of Observations 119,483    63,325    139,383   
 Note: Linear Probability Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. 
Separate regressions for each cell.  Outcomes from the SIPP evaluated in the first month of the 
survey. Demographic controls include gender, race, state-level unemployment rate, and minimum 
wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Appendix Table 2. Likelihood of living with at least one parent as a function of EITC generosity.
SIPP 18-20 
year olds
CPS 18-20 
year olds
SIPP 18-23 
year olds
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 
2008, 18-23 year olds. Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-
20 year olds.  Difference 
in 
differences
Black 0.12 0.23 0.12 0.19 -0.033
(.328) (.418) (.32) (.389) (.005)
Other 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.018
(.252) (.178) (.278) (.249) (.003)
Female 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.000
(.497) (.497) (.497) (.497) (.006)
Age 18.83 18.90 18.80 18.89 0.011
(.81) (.811) (.81) (.82) (.005)
Maximum federal and state EITC (in 1,000s 
of 2011$ ) 4.086 4.030 4.845 5.840 1.050
(1.246) (1.266) (.638) (.795) (.013)
Number of male siblings in the household 0.691 0.605 0.713 0.631 0.003
(.889) (.846) (.905) (.827) (.011)
Number of female siblings in the household 0.650 0.534 0.646 0.587 0.056
(.887) (.775) (.873) (.827) (.011)
Living with both parents 0.669 0.634 0.651 0.595 -0.021
(.471) (.482) (.477) (.491) (.006)
State EITC amount ( as percentage of federal 
benefit) n/a n/a 0.00 0.20 0.20
(.) (.131) (.008)
Number of Observations 19,884             6,860            19,884        8,628           
Appendix Table 3. Descriptive statistics before and after state EITC implementation, relative to individuals who live in states that never 
implement EITCs, 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent, CPS
Never state EITC 
"pre" Pre-state EITC
Never state EITC 
"post" Post-state EITCSource: Consumer Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent. Individuals live in 
households where no parent in the household has more than a high school degree. Individuals who live in states that never implement 
EITCs serve as the comparison group; synthetic 'pre' ('post') period constructed by re-weighting observations in each year to correspond 
to the share of EITC-implementing states in the 'pre' ('post') period in the given year. Standard deviation in parentheses.Outcome variable
Black 0.016   0.011   0.006   -0.003   -0.004   0.003  
(.024) (.02) (.011) (.004) (.004) (.003)
Other 0.016   0.016   0.019 ** 0.003   0.003   0.000  
(.01) (.013) (.008) (.002) (.003) (.003)
Female 0.009   0.007   0.003   0.003   0.002   0.002  
(.015) (.019) (.014) (.003) (.005) (.004)
Age -0.037   0.032 * 0.017   -0.006   -0.001   0.005  
(.034) (.017) (.026) (.008) (.005) (.004)
Number of male siblings 0.083   0.106   -0.008   0.004   0.000   0.004  
(.065) (.079) (.032) (.011) (.012) (.008)
Number of female siblin 0.015   0.030   -0.008   0.012   0.016   -0.004  
(.041) (.042) (.036) (.011) (.012) (.011)
Living with both parents 0.015   0.005   -0.002   -0.014 *** -0.015 *** -0.009 ***
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.004) (.004) (.003)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 31,130    19,285    36,063    81,724        51,374        97,123       
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year olds living 
with at least one parent in the first month of the survey. 
Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell.  SIPP 
outcomes evaluated in each March of the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year 
interacted with indicator for whether the individual lives in a household where neither parent has more than a high school 
degree. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Appendix Table 4. Effect of the maximum federal and state EITC on demographic controls; individuals living with at least 
one parent at the beginning of the survey
18-23 year 
olds, SIPP
18-20 year 
olds, SIPP
18-20 year 
olds, CPS
High-impact sample only Triple-difference
18-23 year olds, 
SIPP
18-20 year olds, 
SIPP
18-20 year olds, 
CPSOutcome variable= In the high-impact sample
Maximum federal and state EITC (in thousands of 
2000 dollars) -0.015   -0.016 -0.023 **
(0.017) (0.015) (0.010)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Number of Observations 81,724    51,374    97,123   
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 
year old individuals living with at least one parent in the first month of the interview. Current Population 
Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one parent.  
 Note: Linear Probability Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate 
regressions for each cell. Outcomes from the SIPP evaluated in each March of the survey.  Coefficient is 
maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the individual 
lives in a household where neither parent has more than a high school degree.  Demographic controls include 
gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in the household, whether both parents are present in 
the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times), state-level 
unemployment rate, and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Appendix Table 5. Likelihood of being categorized as EITC-eligible as a function of EITC generosity. 
CPS 18-20 
year olds
SIPP 18-20 
year olds
SIPP 18-23 
year oldsOutcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.004   0.005   0.008 **
(.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of Schooling 0.043 *** 0.045 *** 0.041 ***
(.011) (0.012) (0.012)
High school graduate 0.012 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 ***
(.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ever enrolled in college 0.013 *** 0.011 ** 0.010 ***
(.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State-specific linear time trends N N N
Number of Observations 81,724    51,374    97,123   
Appendix Table 6. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on 
educational outcomes of 18-23 year olds living in households with at least one parent in the 
first year of the survey, actual eligibility for EITC
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 
2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at least one parent in the first month of the 
survey.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year 
olds living with at least one parent at interview.  
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. 
Separate regressions for each cell. SIPP outcomes evaluated in each March of the 
survey.Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with 
indicator for whether the household was eligible for the EITC in the first year of the survey. 
Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in 
the household, whether both parents are present in the household, a control for number of 
times the respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times), state-level unemployment rate, 
and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
SIPP 18-23 
year olds
CPS 18-20 
year olds
SIPP 18-20 
year oldsTriple-difference
Time 
trends Interactions
Time 
trends Interactions
Time 
trends Interactions
Outcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.006 ** 0.007 * 0.010 *** 0.010 ** 0.018 *** 0.014 ***
(.003) (0.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Years of Schooling 0.028 * 0.017   0.022 ** 0.016   0.047 *** 0.027 ***
(.014) (0.017) (.011) (.012) (.01) (.009)
High school graduate 0.003   0.001   0.005   0.004   0.015 *** 0.010 **
(.003) (0.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Ever enrolled in college 0.011 *** 0.010 ** 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.018 *** 0.015 ***
(.003) (0.004) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.002)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
State-specific linear time trends Y N Y N Y N
Maximum EITC*demographics N Y N Y N Y
High-impact sample*demographics N Y N Y N Y
Number of Observations 81,724    81,724          51,374    51,374           97,123     97,123        
  
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at least one 
parent in the first month of the survey.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, sample of 18-20 year olds living with at least one 
parent at interview.
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell. SIPP outcomes evaluated in 
each March of the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the individual 
lives in a household where neither parent has more than a high school degree.  Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female 
siblings living in the household, whether both parents are present in the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the sample 
(up to 4 times, SIPP sample only), state-level unemployment rate, and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Appendix Table 7. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational outcomes of individuals living with at least one parent in 
the first month of the survey. By data source.
SIPP 18-23 year olds SIPP 18-20 year olds CPS 18-20 year oldsOutcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.028 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Schooling 0.051 *** 0.032 *** 0.082 ***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.021)
High school graduate 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 0.021 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Ever enrolled in college 0.023 *** 0.017 *** 0.029 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Number of Observations 119,483     63,325    139,383   
 CPS 18-20 
year olds
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in parentheses. Separate 
regressions for each cell.Outcomes evaluated in each March of the survey.Coefficient is 
maximum federal and state EITC value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the 
individual lives in a household where neither parent has more than a high school degree. 
Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and female siblings living in the 
household, whether both parents are present in the household, a control for number of times the 
respondent appears in the sample (up to 4 times), state-level unemployment rate, and minimum 
wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 
2008, 18-23 year olds.  Current Population Survey March Supplement 1992-2011, 18-20 year 
olds.
Appendix Table 8. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC benefit on educational 
outcomes of 18-23 year olds. Individuals not living with their parents included in the high-impact 
sample
SIPP 18-23 year 
olds
SIPP 18-20 
year oldsNo 
controls W/controls
Outcome variable
Currently enrolled in college 0.004   0.006  
(0.004) (0.004)
Years of Schooling 0.016   0.022  
(0.014) (0.013)
High school graduate 0.004   0.007 *
(0.004) (0.004)
Ever enrolled in college 0.005   0.007 **
(0.004) (0.004)
Demographic Controls N Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
State Fixed Effects Y Y
State-specific linear time trends N N
Post indicator*demographics N N
Number of Observations 42,947     42,947        
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008, 18-23 year old children living with at least 
one parent in the first month of the survey, individuals who were younger 
than 19 at the start of the survey. 
 Note: OLS Models, clustered standard errors at state level presented in 
parentheses. Separate regressions for each cell. SIPP outcomes evaluated in 
each March of the survey. Coefficient is maximum federal and state EITC 
value in a given year interacted with indicator for whether the individual 
lives in a household where neither parent has more than a high school 
degree. Demographic controls include gender, race, number of male and 
female siblings living in the household, whether both parents are present in 
the household, a control for number of times the respondent appears in the 
sample (up to 4 times, SIPP sample only), state-level unemployment rate, 
and minimum wage. *** indicates significance at p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10.
Appendix Table 9. The effect of the maximum federal and state EITC 
benefit on educational outcomes of individuals living with at least one 
parent in the first month of the survey, 18-23 years old, were younger 
than 19 at the start of the survey. Appendix Figure 1. Effect of EITC on outcomes, by time since state EITC implementation; relative to states that never implement; 18-
20 year olds in the CPS (triple-difference) 
        
a)  Likelihood of being enrolled as full-time college student    b)  Number of years of schooling 
       
c)  Likelihood of having a high school degree      d)  Likelihood of ever enrolling in college 
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